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A REVIEW OF CHINA'S NEW CIVIL EVIDENCE LAW
Paul J. SchmidtO
Abstract: On December 21, 2001, China's Supreme People's Court promulgated
landmark rules concerning the production and use of evidence in civil cases. These rules
became effective on April 1, 2002 and apply to legal actions initiated after that date. The
rules apply in all Chinese courts, from the high and intermediate level courts found at the
provincial and prefecture level, down to the basic level courts found in rural counties and
in urban districts. Of the eighty-three newly promulgated rules, more than half concern
procedures for exchanging, confronting, investigating, or discovering evidence. Eleven
are strict rules of evidence. The remainder is comprised of decision guidelines,
implementation provisions, or some other type of rule. Despite the guidelines'
occasionally remedial tone, Chinese practitioners will want to memorize these rules and
use the language found within them during their debates and summaries to the court. The
new strict rules of evidence provide litigators with direction, while at the same time
providing new avenues for courtroom strategy. The rules require Chinese lawyers to
focus not only on how they will present evidence but also on how such evidence may be
excluded and how they might work to exclude an opponent's evidence. The new rules of
evidence are a welcome new addition to Chinese jurisprudence.
I. INTRODUCTION
On December 21, 2001, China's Supreme People's Court promulgated
landmark rules concerning the production and use of evidence in civil cases.
These rules became effective on April 1, 2002 and apply to legal actions
initiated after that date.t The rules apply in all Chinese courts, from the high
and intermediate level courts found at the provincial and prefecture level,
down to the basic level courts found in rural counties and in urban districts.
2
The new rules have been enthusiastically received by Chinese litigators
t Paul Schmidt is an attorney with Baker & McKenzie's China practice group, intellectual property
division, Hong Kong.
I am grateful to Mr. Ge Xiaoying (i/JNJX), a partner with Beilang Law Firm in Beijing, China,
for his assistance in preparing this Article. The opinions expressed herein are the author's own.
Provisions from the Supreme People's Court Concerning Evidence in Civil Matters (] ,,5
r, W=- M6T-Z ) art. 83 (2001) (P.R.C.) (promulgated Dec. 21, 2001, effective Apr. 1, 2002),
law in Chinese available at http;//www.civillaw.com.cn/typical/LawCenter/Content.asp?No=5010 (last
visited Oct. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Provisions from the Supreme People's Court] (The Provisions contain six
sections, which in turn contain eighty-three consecutively numbered articles. Section 1 contains Articles 1-
14; Section 2 contains Articles 15-31; Section 3 contains Articles 32-46; Section 4 contains Articles 47-62;
Section 5 contains Articles 63-79; Section 6 contains Articles 80-83).
2 There is no federal system in China. JAMES M. ZIMMERMAN, CHtNA LAW DESKBOOK: A LEGAL
GUIDE FOR FOREIGN-INVESTED ENTERPRISES 494 (1999). Rules promulgated by the Supreme People's
Court apply in all courts. Compare, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 1 (indicating that the rules govern civil procedure
in United States District Courts).
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because they standardize important pretrial and trial procedures.3 Prior to
the rules' promulgation, many of the procedures were already being
4followed in a number of courts. These procedures, however, were not
universally employed. Rules often changed from case to case, and within
the same court. 5 The new rules eliminate the ad hoc nature of litigation in
China,6 and show significant concern for the fairness of the process, as well
as the fairness of the outcome. Finally, the rules constitute a significant shift
away from case management and direction by the court to case management
and direction by the parties themselves.
The rules respond to a number of criticisms raised against the Chinese
court system. First, the rules follow China's accession to the World Trade
Organization and address concerns about whether China can make its legal
system more transparent, accountable, and fair.7 Second, the rules respond
to concerns that Chinese judges are often not well educated and lack legal
training by providing evidence decision guidelines. 8 Third, the rules provide
direction in the hot-button area of intellectual property matters. For instance,
where the rules provide burden of proof rules, the first matter addressed is
patent infringement. 9 This is an odd top billing because patent infringement
cases are classified as torts in China, and torts constitute less than ten
percent of the annual case filings.
10
The rules themselves are divided into six sections, which in turn
contain eighty-three Articles." While each section is not analytically pure,
and often more than one topic is addressed in each, a rough outline is as
follows. Section I consists largely of burden of proof rules and evidence
production and exchange procedures that the parties must follow. Section II
addresses when, if ever, the court may engage in the investigation and
collection of evidence. It also concerns authenticators, a special type of
expert witness described in detail below. Section III discusses evidence
3 Telephone Interviews with Ge Xiaoying, Partner, Beilang Law Firm, Beijing, China (Oct.-Nov.
2002) [hereinafter Telephone Interviews with Ge Xiaoying].
4 id.
5 id.
6 This statement is true for prominent courts located in China's large coastal cities. In less
prominent or rural courts, it would not be surprising to find the rules either not enforced or ignored.
7 See, e.g., SUPACHAI PANITCHPAKDI & MARK CLIFFORD, CHINA AND THE WTO, CHANGING CHINA,
CHANGING WORLD TRADE 147 (2002); NicIIoLAs R. LARDY, INTEGRATING CHINA INTO THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY 154 (2002).
' See STANLEY B. LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO 253-54 (1999).
9 Provisions from the Supreme People's Court, supra note 1, art 4 (1).
'0 ZHONGGUO FALU NIANJIAN [Law Yearbook for China] (1991-1998) reprinted in LUBMAN, supra
note 8, at 255.
i Within the six sections of the Provisions, the articles are numbered consecutively from article one
to article eighty-three. Provisions from the Supreme People's Court, supra note 1.
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exchange procedures. Section IV includes procedures for examining and
confronting an opponent's evidence, and strict rules of evidence that
determine the admission or exclusion of evidence at trial. Section V
provides guidelines for courts when assessing evidence. Finally, Section VI
contains provisions concerning the implementation of the new rules.
Of the eighty-three newly promulgated Articles, more than half
concern procedures for exchanging, confronting, investigating, or
discovering evidence. Eleven are strict rules of evidence. The remainder of
the rules contain decision guidelines, implementation provisions, or some
other type of rule. This Article examines the new rules and discusses some
of the issues that are likely to arise as they are applied in Chinese courts. It
discusses how Chinese practitioners might utilize the rules to fashion
evidentiary objections that are not common in Chinese courts, but for which
there is a need and desire. Finally, it provides an explication of the new
evidence exchange procedures and the procedures for examining and
confronting evidence.
II. BURDENS OF PROOF-ARE THEY BURDENS OF PERSUASION OR
BURDENS OF PRODUCTION?
Whether a burden of proof rule is one of persuasion or production is
an issue that is routinely encountered in the United States.12 Similar issues
arise in China's new evidence law, and it is difficult to tell whether the
burdens of proof set forth therein are ones of persuasion or production. A
burden of persuasion requires the charged party to persuade the court that its
version of the facts is in fact true based on a certain standard of proof.' 3 For
instance, in the United States, the standard of proof in civil cases usually
requires a party to prove elements to the judge or jury by a preponderance of
the evidence. 14 Alternately, a burden of production, sometimes referred to as
the burden of producing evidence, requires the charged party to bring forth
some evidence supporting the case in order to avoid an adverse finding or
12 See, e.g., Dep't. of Labor v. Maher Terminals, Inc., 512 U.S. 267 (1994) (discussing the difference
between the burden of production and the burden of persuasion).
13 See generally BROUN, ET. AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 336 (5th ed. 1999). This is how
Justice O'Connor interprets the phrase "burden of proof" as found in § 7(c) of the Administrative
Procedure Act. Maher, 512 U.S. at 276.
14 See generally MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 13, § 339.
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directed verdict. 15 Usually, a party who bears a burden of persuasion on an
issue also bears a corresponding burden of production. 16
The burden of proof rules in Article 4 can be read either as burdens of
persuasion or production. The language used to describe how burdens are
assigned is ambiguous.' 7 This ambiguity is likely to cause confusion as each
court applies the rules and gives its own interpretations. The question of
whether the new evidence rules place burdens of persuasion or burdens of
proof on parties is important for case strategy. If the burdens of proof in
Articles 4 through 6 place the burdens of production on plaintiffs, but the
defendant bears the burden of persuasion, then all the plaintiff has to do is
file a case with minimal evidence and then the defendant bears the burden of
proving his or her innocence or lack of responsibility. If, however, the rules
are burdens of persuasion, then the plaintiff must at least present a prima
facie case at trial before the burden shifts to the defense to put on its
evidence.' 8
An argument can be made for either position, but it is more likely that
the rules in Article 4 place the burden of persuasion on defendants, owing to
their similarity to the many well-known burden-shifting rules found in the
United States and England. Indeed, in the United States and England, courts
have often imposed evidentiary presumptions upon defendants in lieu of a
burden of persuasion, placing heavier burdens on defendants than the
Chinese rules. A presumption is an evidentiary device whereby if a party
proves certain basic facts, certain presumed facts are deemed to be true (e.g.,
if a wife has not seen or had contact from her husband for seven years a
court presumes he is dead). 19 Once a party proves certain basic facts and a
presumption is in effect, the opposing party may defeat the presumption, but
only by disproving the basic facts, or the presumed facts. 20  The factual
situations in which U.S. and English courts impose evidentiary presumptions
on civil defendants are very similar to the factual situations outlined in the
new Chinese rules. This similarity suggests that the Chinese rules place
similar, but distinguishable, evidentiary burdens on civil defendants.
15 See generally id. § 336. This is the effect of Justice Souter's interpretation of the phrase "burden
of proof' as found in § 7(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act. Maher, 512 U.S. at 281-97 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
i6 See generally MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 13, § 337.
17 See, e.g., Provisions from the Supreme People's Court, supra note 1, art. 4 (2) (the phrase "the
infringing person shall be responsible for producing evidence to prove" could be read as either a burden of
persuasion or a burden of production).
See generally MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 13, § 339; see also Mahler, 24 F.3d at 272.
In United States federal court, presumptions are governed by state law. FED. R. EvtD. 302.
2o See generally MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 13, §342.
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Article 4 consists of eight subparts, with each containing a separate
burden of proof rule. Article 4, Part 2 likely places the burden of persuasion
on the defendant to prove the lack of causation where damages were caused
by highly dangerous operations. 21 This rule, placing the burden of
persuasion for the element of causation on the defendant, corresponds with
cases in the United States that involve rocket tests or blasting. In those cases,
the plaintiff is required to present prima facie evidence of liability and then a
presumption requires the defendant to prove a lack of liability.
22
Similarly, under Article 4, Part 4, a defending building owner must
present evidence to prove lack of responsibility in cases where an object has
fallen from a building. 23 England has also shifted the burden of persuasion
to defendants in falling materials cases by employing a presumption of
negligence.2 4 Under Article 4, Part 5, animal owners are responsible for
producing evidence to prove that their animals did not cause the damage.
25
This rule has similar counterparts in the United States. 26 Part 8 also imposes
a burden of persuasion on defendants in medical malpractice, requiring that
all medical institutions produce evidence to prove that there is no causal
relationship between the medical act and the harmful consequences. 12 The
Chinese rule in Part 8, placing the burden of persuasion on the defendant,
may be analogized to the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
28
against defendants in U.S. medical malpractice cases. Finally, Parts 3 and
6 place the responsibility of proving affirmative defenses on the defendant in
certain cases. 29 The United States has similar requirements for affirmative
defenses.30 In all of the above, the plaintiff must still first meet a burden of
production before the burden of persuasion shifts to the defendant. 31
Because Parts 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8 of Article 4 can be analogized to well-
"i Provisions from the Supreme People's Court, supra note 1, art. 4 (2).
22 See, e.g., Smith v. Lockheed Propulsion Co., 56 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1967) (liability found where
nearby water well was damaged immediately following an in-ground rocket test).
23 Provisions from the Supreme People's Court, supra note 1, art. 4 (4).
24 See, e.g., Bryne v. Boadle, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Ex. 1863) (negligence implied where man was hit
by a falling barrel).
2' Provisions from the Supreme People's Court, supra note 1, art. 4 (5).26 See, e.g., Swerdfeger v. Krueger, 358 P.2d 479 (1960); Collins v. Otto, 369 P.2d 564 (1962)
(holding that owners of wild animals are ordinarily held strictly liable for damages caused by them).
27 Provisions from the Supreme People's Court, supra note 1, art. 4 (8).
28 See, e.g., Ybara v. Spangard, 154 P.2d 687 (1944) (finding negligence where patient underwent
appendectomy and subsequently suffered paralyzing shoulder injuries). Ybara is an important case because
it generated a great deal of discussion about the limits of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. See, e.g., Warren A.
Seavey, Res Ipsa Loquitur, Tabula in Naufragio, 63 HARV. L. REV. 643 (1950).
" Provisions from the Supreme People's Court, supra note 1, art 4 (3) & (6).
30 See, e.g., Continental v. Intra Brokers, Inc., 24 F.3d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 1994) (indicating that
defendant bears the burden of proof for an affirmative defense).
31 Provisions from the Supreme People's Court, supra note 1, art. 4.
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recognized burden shifting rules in the United States and England, it is likely
that Parts I and 7 were also intended to place a burden of persuasion on the
defendant.
Three of the burden of proof rules require specific discussion: Article
4, Part 3; Article 4, Part 8; and Article 6. First, if all of the rules in Article 4
place a burden of persuasion on the defendant as argued above, then, under
Article 4, Part 3, a plaintiff in a Chinese environmental pollution case need
only produce evidence of pollution, the identity of the polluter, and harmful
consequences before the burden of persuasion is placed on the defendant.32
This is a significant difference from the law in the United States where the
plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion on the issue of whether injuries were
caused by the pollution. 33 As it currently stands, based on the burden of
proof, it is far easier to successfully prosecute a pollution claim in China
than it is in the United States. Second, Article 4, Part 8, can be read to place
the burden of persuasion on the defendant in medical malpractice cases,
making it an analogue of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. But it is important
to recognize the limits of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. Such cases are
extremely limited in their scope in the United States and the vast majority of
medical malpractice cases in the vast majority of states still require the
plaintiff to prove causation. 34 Finally, Article 6 is problematic because its
language reads strongly as a rule of persuasion in labor dispute matters. An
employee need only plead that he or she was improperly fired, dismissed,
that his or her payments were improperly reduced, or his or her years of
employment were improperly calculated.35 The employer is then responsible
for producing evidence to prove otherwise.
36
The burden of proof rules in Article 4 of the new rules present a
challenge to Chinese courts and practitioners that American and English
courts have grappled with for decades. By referencing analogous factual
situations in American and English law, Chinese courts may be able to
32 Provisions from the Supreme People's Court, supra note 1, art 4 (3).
33 See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1200-05 (6th Cir. 1988).
34 See, e.g., Novak v. United States, 865 F.2d 718 (6th Cir. 1989); Howell v. Baptist Hosp.,
2003 WL 112762 (Tenn.Ct.App. Jan 14, 2003) (holding that while the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is an
accepted method of proving professional negligence in medical malpractice cases, application of the
doctrine would have to be supported by expert testimony which was not sufficient in the case); States v.
Lourdes Hosp., 297 A.D. 2d 450 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not
apply to medical malpractice action arising from injury allegedly sustained by patient during surgery,
where expert testimony was required to establish that patient's injury was of a kind which ordinarily did not
occur in the absence of negligence).
31 Provisions from the Supreme People's Court, supra note 1, art. 6.
36 Id. art. 6.
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clarify burdens of proof in civil cases and further the normalization of
Chinese litigation.
III. EXPERT WITNESSES: A TWO TIER SYSTEM
The rules describe two types of expert witnesses. 37 The first type
consists of "authenticators" (N P), .4). The second type consists of
"general experts" (---mfa )k). As shown below, the basic position of
the rules is that most expert issues can be resolved through the use of a
single neutral objective expert-an authenticator. Almost as an afterthought,
the rules acknowledge that experts may disagree and expert opinions will
sometimes have to be evaluated in an adversarial arena. In addition, the
rules acknowledge that the world of experts is larger than the world of
authenticators and these people may provide valuable testimony.
Nevertheless, the rules fail to address the critical issues of who is an expert
and what is an expertise.
A. Authenticators (MZ_(f)
Simply stated, authenticators are experts that are government
certified. Certification is completed on an annual basis.39  The basic
process for obtaining an authentication-or what U.S. lawyers describe as an
expert opinion-is found in Articles 25 and 26. A party bearing an
authentication burden (or requiring an expert opinion) must first apply to the
court for permission. 40 That party must then also pre-pay the authentication
expenses as well as cooperate in providing "relevant materials" so that the
expert work can be performed. 4' Once the authentication application is
approved by the court, the parties must try to agree on the authenticator and
42the authentication institution, if needed. If no agreement can be reached,
the court will decide on an authenticator.4 3 It is not clear how long the
parties are given to try and reach an agreement nor when the court must
choose if no agreement can be reached.
3' Rules concerning "authenticators" are found at Provisions from the Supreme People's Court,
supra note 1, arts. 25-29, 59-61, 71, 80. The rule concerning "general experts" is found at id. art. 61.
38 Telephone Interviews with Ge Xiaoying, supra note 3
39 ld.
40 Provisions from the Supreme People's Court, supra note 1, art. 25.
41 id.
41 Id. art. 26.
43 id.
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In some instances, where the expert opinion is simple and never really
in doubt, the authenticator's report will, in all likelihood, resolve liability
issues and lead to settlement or some other quick resolution of the case. In
such circumstances, the damaged party will want to make certain that the
adverse party does not attempt to unfairly influence the authenticator.
In other cases where the science at issue is complicated, or where the
parties have widely divergent views concerning the basic facts, the choice of
authenticator will likely be a disputed matter because of the significant
weight a government-certified and court-appointed expert carries. In many
instances, the authenticator will render an opinion about the ultimate facts at
issue. In those instances, the gravity of the case shifts away from the court
and toward the authenticator. Each side will then attempt to influence the
authenticator into its particular view of the underlying facts knowing that, if
successful, a favorable opinion will follow. Even where the underlying facts
are not in significant dispute, it is common for reputable experts to
legitimately disagree. Again, in such instances, the choice of authenticator
will be critical and hard fought.
Where a party is dissatisfied with the authentication results, it may
apply to the court for re-authentication, provided it can show: "(1) that the
authentication institution or authenticator is not qualified; (2) that the
authentication process is seriously illegal; (3) that there is obvious
inadequate evidence to support the authentication conclusions; or (4) other
circumstances calling the authentication into question." 44 Even if re-
authentication fails, a party may still question the authentication evidence
before the court.45 A party's own expert is allowed to directly interrogate an
authenticator.46
B. Authenticators (_ffZA(W): How Do You Feed These Creatures?
Preparing an expert to perform his or her task is difficult enough in
the United States where the expert is typically hired to provide an opinion
favorable to the client. Knowing how to prepare an expert where the desired
opinion is uncertain is even more difficult. American lawyers often talk
about "feeding their experts, 4 7 which means providing experts with needed
4 Id. art. 27.
41 Id. arts. 59 & 71.
46 Id. art. 61. Unless the expert is exceptionally good at avoiding the jargon of his or her trade, such
practice is best avoided because it is likely that the only two people who will understand the interrogation
are the expert and the authenticator.
4' DAVID M. MALONE & PAUL J. ZWIER, EXPERT RULES: 100 (AND MORE) POINTS You NEED TO
KNOW ABOUT EXPERT WITNESSES 9-17 (2d ed. 1999).
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information and ideas without also giving them information and ideas that
hurt the client.4 8 Every case has a combination of "good" and "bad" facts.
If a litigator provides an expert with only the "good" facts and the expert
will become suspicious that the party has something to hide. If a litigator
supplies too much information to the expert, the opponent will learn all
kinds of "bad" facts from the expert that it may use to raise questions and
muddy the water. So what is the lawyer to do? In important cases, it is not
uncommon for U.S. lawyers to hire consulting experts to advise them on
how to "feed" their testifying experts.49
This feeding issue is even more important in China because, as
discussed above, the court appoints a single, highly influential government
approved expert. The interested party is then required to provide the expert
with all "relevant materials" (4H t4'P). 50 Many questions remain
unanswered about the definition of "relevant materials." Fights over what
constitutes "relevant materials" are inevitable. The rule does not clarify
whether parties are required to tell the authenticator bad facts as well as
good ones. Moreover, it does not answer whether parties must disclose bad
facts that might be irrelevant. The rules do not reveal what the
consequences will be if a bad fact is not disclosed and the authenticator
eventually learns of it and deems it relevant. Such a discovery may
negatively affect a party's credibility before the court. If, on the other hand,
a party elects to provide full disclosure of all facts-good and bad-it is still
possible that the authenticator will be distracted by irrelevant bad facts or the
opposing party will exploit the bad facts to try and divert the case.
The rules do not explain how much assistance parties are allowed to
provide in order to help an authenticator accurately and competently
complete the task. For instance, the rules do not explain whether a party's
own scientist may guide an authenticator as to where to look and how to test
a fact. This assistance might be characterized as part of providing "relevant
materials." However, the dangers of such a practice are obvious: while a
party will want to make certain an authenticator's opinion is correct, too
much help from an inside expert may result in a blistering cross-examination
as an opponent probes into the aid given, or, even worse, a complaint from
the authenticator to the judge about being misled or unduly influenced. The
breadth and scope of "relevant materials" will be a fertile area for cross-
examination and potential conflict. Counsel will have to consider carefully
48 Id.
41 Id. at 13-15.
50 See Provisions from the Supreme People's Court, supra note 1, art. 25.
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just how to go about feeding "relevant materials" to authenticators in each
instance.
C. General Expert Witnesses ( f l '. ,)
The new rules allow for general expert witnesses, but provide no
guidelines as to who can be an expert or what constitutes expert knowledge.
Article 61 of the rules allows parties to apply to the People's Court to allow
one or two general expert witnesses (impan- )\.) to testify concerning
specialized issues arising in a case. No further guidance is provided
concerning who is an expert or what constitutes an expertise. For example,
the rules do not address whether afeng shui expert could take the stand and
give an opinion that a building failed because of a bad design or location.
Chinese courts will inevitably have to determine these and other
issues in the absence of explicit guidelines. The first question that Chinese
courts will probably encounter is how much control they should exercise
against the possible misuse of junk science in their courtrooms. 51 The court
could set standards based on the education or experience of the expert
testifying, or the scientific community' s acceptance of the science presented.
Alternatively, the court could allow all expert evidence, thus placing the
responsibility on the finder of fact to sort out the good science and the bad
science. These questions are not easy to answer.
The federal courts in the United States have adopted a four-prong
standard of expert reliability. Prior to the enactment of the United States
Federal Rules of Evidence, expert evidence must have been generally
accepted by the scientific community in order to be introduced in federal
court. 52 In 1999, the U.S. Supreme Court articulated a new test for
determining scientific reliability. 53 Under the Daubert test, a court must
weigh: (1) whether the expert's knowledge was subjected to peer-reviewed
publication; (2) whether the scientific evidence has a known or knowable
error rate; (3) whether the scientific evidence is generally accepted in the
relevant scientific or specialized field from which the expert comes; and (4)
whether the expert's testimony has been tested or is it testable.
54
51 This issue is minimized, but not completely eliminated, by the government-approved authenticator
system.
52 Frye v. United States, 54 App.D.C. 46, 47, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (1923).
" Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993); see also Kumho Tire
Company, Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
14 See Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993); see also MALONE
& ZWEIER, supra note 47, at 5.
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The standard of evidence articulated by Daubert has the advantage of
admitting only established and tested knowledge, but it has the disadvantage
of potentially disallowing the newest and best research on a particular
issue-which could also result in poor judicial decisions. Undoubtedly,
Chinese courts will have to decide how they want to handle expert testimony.
But for now, Chinese practitioners are free to argue these issues as they see
fit.
IV. RULES OF EVIDENCE-A COMPARISON WITH THE FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE.
The following section describes the strict rules of evidence that are
included in the new Chinese rules and compares them with similar United
States Federal Rules of Evidence. The Chinese provisions will ultimately
guide the court in deciding what evidence is fair and admissible and what
evidence is unfair and inadmissible. The correlations provided in this
section may be useful to practitioners as disputes arise under the new rules.
A. Judicial Notice
Article 9, which sets out a list of facts that do not have to be proved
through the presentation of evidence, is analogous to the concept of judicial
notice found in the United States Federal Rule of Evidence 201 [hereinafter
Fed. R. Evid. 201]. Fed. R. Evid. 201 allows a court to take notice of any
fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute, in that it is either generally
known or its accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned. Similarly, Article 9
requires no evidence for "(1) facts known by all people; (2) laws (and
theorems) of nature; (3) facts that can be readily deduced from everyday
experience or through other laws; (4) facts set out in a judgment or
arbitration award that is final; and (5) facts proved in a valid notarized
document."55 Unlike U.S. federal courts where a judicially noticed fact is
conclusive in civil cases, in China a party can still challenge all the facts
admitted through Article 9, except for laws and theorems of nature.
Unfortunately, it is not clear what the actual procedure is for presenting an
Article 9 fact to the court.
56
The American concept of judicial notice, which has a longer history
than Article 9, may be referenced by Chinese lawyers in making Article 9
arguments. Over time, U.S. courts have judicially noticed a wide variety of
55 Provisions from the Supreme People's Court, supra note 1, art. 9.
56 id.
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facts that a lawyer might reference in the Chinese system to speed the
presentation of a case. For instance, it is possible for U.S. courts to take
judicial notice of the science of radar; by presenting the American practice
to a Chinese court, a practitioner might eliminate the need to present
evidence on this complicated issue. 57 While it is usually a questionable
practice for Chinese lawyers to cite to U.S. case law in their arguments, in
this particular narrow area Chinese judges are likely to find such cases
genuinely helpful and readily transferable because, in them, judges often
summarize and explain common, but complicated, technical processes for
use by other judges.58
B. Compromise and Offers to Compromise
China's Article 67 and Fed. R. Evid. 408 both restrict a party's right
to use statements made in settlement negotiations as evidence against the
other. Unlike Fed. R. Evid. 408, however, Article 67 contains no exceptions
allowing for the use of such evidence at trial. 59 Given the strong Chinese
preference for reaching a negotiated settlement, the increased protection
provided by Article 67 is not surprising.
C. Witness Competency
China's Article 53 and Fed. R. Evid. 601 both govern witness
competency. Under Fed. R. Evid. 601, witness is presumed competent, as
long as they have first-hand knowledge of the events at issue and submit to
an oath. A judge makes the final determination of competency. 61 Under
Chinese rules, every person is allowed to be a witness unless he or she is too
young or mentally infirm for the subject matter at issue. While disputes
about witness competency are rare, they do arise, especially with respect to
child witnesses.
57 See, e.g., People v. Walker, 610 P.2d 496, 498 (Colo. 1980). As a further foundation for
admission, however, the court must then consider whether the radar unit was properly operated and
accurate. Id.
58 id.
59 Provisions from the Supreme People's Court, supra note 1, art. 67.
60 A preference which, believe it or not, is even stronger than the average federal judge's preference
for settlement.
61 See generally MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 13, §§ 61, 70.
62 See Provisions from the Supreme People's Court, supra note 1, art. 53.
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D. Court Control of Questioning
Article 60, which allows the court to control witness examinations, is
similar to Fed. R. Evid. 611, which allows the court to control the order of
presentation of the evidence and the form of the questions. 63 However,
Article 60 simply states that when examining a witness no menacing,
insulting, or misleading language or means may be used.
64
Historically in China, there has been no restriction on the use of
leading questions during a direct examination.65 This is a significant issue in
the United States. Typically the calling party can only ask its witness non-
leading questions. 66 A few Chinese practitioners are familiar with the
problems posed by leading questions on direct examination. 67 A skilled
Chinese trial lawyer will object to such questions during direct examination,
but these objections are rare and not always understood by the court.68
Perhaps now such an objection can be coupled with an argument that the use
of leading questions during a direct examination constitutes "misleading
language or means" under Article 60. M 1
E. Witness Interrogation and Sequestration
Article 58 and Fed. R. Evid. 614 both allow the court to interrogate
witnesses.69 Article 58, in addition, provides for the automatic sequestration
of witnesses. In the United States, sequestration typically only occurs if a
party requests it pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 615.70
Currently, U.S. courts are split on whether sequestration under Fed. R.
Evid. 615 implicitly forbids witnesses from speaking to one another about
their testimony outside of court. Some courts say such a prohibition is
implied because the purpose of the rule is to prevent witness collusion, and,
if witnesses could meet outside the courtroom to discuss their testimony, this
purpose would be frustrated.7' Other courts say that the precise language of
the rule only forbids witnesses from hearing the testimony of other
witnesses, and to get involved in alleged out-of-court violations would lead
63 See generally MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 13, §§ 4, 5.
64 Id. art. 60.
65 Telephone Interviews with Ge Xiaoying, supra note 3.
66 See FED. R. EvD. 611(c).
67 Telephone Interviews with Ge Xiaoying, supra note 3.
68 Id.
69 See generally MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 13, § 8.
70 See generally id. § 50.
71 See, e.g., United States v. Rugiero, 20 F.3d 1387, 1394 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 878
(1994).
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to endless enforcement hearings.72 Chinese courts may be subject to similar
issues because both Fed. R. Evid. 615 and Article 58 serve an identical
purpose-to prevent witness collusion. Nevertheless, the specific language
of Article 58, like that of Fed. R. Evid. 615, is limited and states that when
one witness is being questioned, no other witness may be present.73 It does
not say anything about what witnesses can say to each other outside the
courtroom.
74
F. Best Evidence
China's best evidence rules are found in Articles 10, 20, 22 and 49;
corresponding U.S. rules that are found at Fed. R. Evid. 1001 through 1003.
The Chinese rules require the production of the original document or thing
as evidence.75 A duplicate may be allowed, but only if it is too difficult to
present the original document or thing, or the original no longer exists but
76evidence shows that the duplicate is identical. In the U.S., duplicates are
allowed as evidence except when a genuine question is raised as to the
authenticity of the original or, under the circumstances, it would be unfair to
admit the duplicate in lieu of the original. 77 In China, it is up to the
proponent of the evidence to produce the original, and if the original cannot
be produced, then the proponent must fit the duplicate within one of the
exceptions.78 In the United States, duplicates are allowed as evidence except
when a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original or
where it would be unfair to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original.79
Accordingly, it is more important to maintain control over the original in
China than it is in the United States. For many U.S. companies, it is
common to reduce much of their paperwork to microfiche, or to save
scanned copies on their computers. While such documents should still be
admissible in China, companies operating in China may want to pay closer
attention to their document archiving policies, because Chinese courts show
a clear preference for working with originals.
72 See, e.g., United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1175-76 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S.
1223 (1994); United States v. Scharstein, 531 F. Supp. 460, 464 (E.D. Ky. 1982).
73 Provisions from the Supreme People's Court, supra note 1, art. 58.
" See id.
15 Provisions from the Supreme People's Court, supra note 1, arts 10, 20, 22,49.
76 See id. art. 49.
77 FED. R. EVD. 1003; see generally MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 13, § 236.
78 See Provisions from the Supreme People's Court, supra note 1, art. 49.
79 FED. R. EvD. 1003.
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G. Hearsay
Hearsay that would be inadmissible in U.S. courts is regularly allowed
in Chinese courts. 80 For instance, in China, written testimonial letters are
routinely admitted as evidence. 81 Even though it is understood that it is
preferable to have the witness appear in court, this is not mandatory. 82 As a
matter of practice, it is the personal choice of the witness to either appear in
court or not, and given the Chinese cultural tradition of avoiding open public
confrontation, witnesses often choose not to appear. 83  In spite of this
established practice, the new evidence law contains the nascent elements
needed for making basic hearsay objections. 84 These elements are not
systematically set out, and they are contradicted by other provisions in the
law, but nevertheless they are there. For U.S. practitioners who devote
significant time to learn how to identify hearsay and its exceptions, it is
surprising to learn that the Chinese have not historically had rules or
doctrines regulating its admission. U.S. lawyers are drilled on identifying
hearsay and then objecting to it quickly-so much so that this reaction
becomes instinctual. Such instincts then reinforce the notion that prohibiting
hearsay is a universal legal principle.
The actual history behind the Anglo-American hearsay doctrine,
however, shows that this objection to hearsay is not so universal. The
doctrine actually developed over a significant period of time. Professors
Charles A. Wright and Arthur R. Miller devote a large part of their treatise
to tracing the development of the hearsay exception. 85 While the hearsay
doctrine is old, it is not as old as U.S. lawyers might imagine. The doctrine
probably took root in the 1600s, around the time of Shakespeare. 86 But even
at that time the concept was limited to verbal testimony. 87 Written
statements and affidavits were routinely admitted as evidence, and it was not
until much later that the statements in those writings were also considered
inadmissible hearsay.
88
The Federal Rules of Evidence themselves reveal America's ongoing
struggle with the concept of hearsay. Fed. R. Evid. 801 utilizes roughly 300
80 FED. R. EvID. 801-807; see generally MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 13, §§ 244-253.
sI Telephone Interviews with Ge Xiaoying, supra note 3.
12 Provisions from the Supreme People's Court, supra note 1, art. 56.
93 Telephone Interviews with Ge Xiaoying, supra note 3.
Provisions from the Supreme People's Court, supra note 1, art. 55.
85 See 30 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§§ 6342-6348 (West 1997).
86 See id. § 6343 at 270.
87 See id.
s Id. §6344at321.
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words to define the concept of hearsay. Fed. R. Evid. 802 provides the
general prohibition followed by twenty-eight exceptions where hearsay is
allowed-not including the Fed. R. Evid. 807 residual exception. From a
practical perspective, most of what individuals learn and rely upon is
hearsay-and most of the time such reliance is justified. Ultimately, the
unsystematic and contradictory nascent hearsay provisions found in the
Chinese evidence law are perhaps inevitable. Rather than reflecting
ambivalence about hearsay evidence, Chinese hearsay doctrine reflects the
innate difficulties found in hearsay itself. After all, it took hundreds of years
for English and American lawyers to develop the doctrine, and, at least in
the United States, the doctrine is still revised on a regular basis.
89
Article 55 contains the most essential anti-hearsay provision:
witnesses should appear in court to testify and be cross-examined. (& .ff.
'M:E 34fi)ff - ). Such provisions can arguably be used to
exclude evidence in written form where the declaring witness cannot be
cross-examined. It can also arguably be used to exclude statements made by
witnesses not presently testifying. This latter argument is bolstered by
reference to Article 57, which provides, in part, that the witness appearing in
court should objectively state the facts that he or she personally experienced.
Unfortunately, Chinese law also contains provisions that allow what
Articles 55 and 57 restrict. Article 56 allows a non-appearing witness to
present written testimony-but only where he or she cannot appear due to
real difficulties. Such real difficulties include old age, disability, inability to
travel, a special job posting, great distance between the witness and the court,
natural disasters, and other circumstances. Similarly, if evidence is coming
from overseas, it seems Article 11 will admit it if it has been properly
notarized.90 Article 9 allows facts proved in valid notarized documents. The
law provides no direction on how to resolve these contradictions.
The concept of inadmissible hearsay is not entirely foreign to China,
and skilled Chinese attorneys are aware of the problems such evidence
presents. They often question and argue against the credibility of such
evidence. 9 1 China is beginning to embark on a codification of its own
89 See, e.g., 30B MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 7025, at 224-251
(West 2000 & Supp. 2003) (amending rule 801 (d)(2)(E) to codify the holding in Bourjaily v. United States,
483 U.S. 171 (1987) by stating expressly that a court shall consider the context of a co-conspirator's
statement in determining the existence of the conspiracy and in determining the participation therein of the
party against whom the statement is offered.)
90 Provisions from the Supreme People's Court, supra note 1, art. 11.
91 Telephone Interviews with Ge Xiaoying, supra note 3.
VOL. 12 No. 2
A REVIEW OF CHINA 'S NEW CIVIL EVIDENCE LA W
hearsay law and it is unclear whether the rules will be similar to those found
in the Federal Rules of Evidence. It may be that they are quite different.
V. EVIDENCE PRODUCTION AND THE EXCLUSIONARY SANCTION FOR LATE
PRODUCTION
The core of the new Chinese evidence law concerns a number of
fundamental procedural rules, including, most importantly, provisions
delineating mandatory evidence exchanges. 92 Because the exchange and
discovery of evidence is such a critical part of any lawsuit, such procedures
are explicated here at length. The equally critical process of examining and
confronting an opponent's evidence, a process known as zhizheng (%), is
also explored at length.
Under the new rules, once a complaint is filed with the court, it is first
examined to determine whether or not the court has jurisdiction, whether the
complaint is sufficiently clear, whether there is an appropriate defendant,
and whether or not the complaint is otherwise properly filed. 93 If the
complaint is accepted by the court, the court will issue a series of notices to
the parties pursuant to Article 33. The plaintiff is notified of the case's
acceptance, and the defendant is then notified of the complaint and is
summoned to answer it by a certain deadline. 94 The servicing of pleadings is
handled by the court and not directly by the parties.
95
The court simultaneously gives notice to the parties about producing
evidence, how the burdens of proof will be allocated, the circumstances
under which a party may request the court to investigate and collect
evidence, the time when evidence must be exchanged by the parties, and the
consequences for failing to produce evidence. 96 Currently, at least in Beijing,
this informational notice is being distributed to the parties via a form
produced by the court. 97 The information on the form is consistent with the
evidence rules.
98
The parties may agree on when the evidence will be exchanged, but if
they cannot agree, then the court will set a deadline.99 The court selected
92 See Provisions from the Supreme People's Court, supra note 1, arts. 32-46.
93 This does not preclude a party from raising a lack of jurisdiction defense on its own. A party may
do so pursuant to Article 38 of the Civil Procedure Law. Civil Procedure Law, art. 38 (1991) (P.R.C.),
English translation available at http://www.cietac-sz.org.cn/cietac/English/Convention/Cpl0 .htm.
94 Provisions from the Supreme People's Court, supra note 1, art. 33.
95 LUBMAN, supra note 8 at 258.
9' Provisions from the Supreme People's Court, supra note 1, arts. 33, 38.
97 Telephone Interviews with Ge Xiaoying, supra note 3.
98 Id.
99 Provisions from the Supreme People's Court, supra note 1, art. 33.
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deadline must be no earlier than the thirtieth day following the plaintiffs
notice of acceptance and the defendant's notice of service.'°° Currently,
many litigants are agreeing to exchange evidence fifteen days after receiving
their notices. 0 1 If the court picks the exchange date, it usually picks the
thirtieth day.
°2
Article 34 sets the cut-off date for filing a counterclaim or an amended
complaint. That date is concurrent with the deadline set for exchanging
evidence. 103 Accordingly, if the parties pick the fifteenth day following
notice as the evidence exchange deadline, the case is procedurally solidified
very quickly-far faster than what often occurs in the United States.
Most importantly, Article 34 mandates what is effectively an
exclusionary sanction if evidence is not exchanged by the deadline. 104
Evidence submitted by a party beyond the deadline will not be zhizheng-ed.
Moreover, because evidence that is not zhizheng-ed cannot be considered by
the court, the ultimate result is exclusion. 105 Article 43 states the
exclusionary rule in more direct language: "Evidence submitted by the
parties after the evidence exchange deadline, which is not new evidence,
shall not be accepted by the People's Court." 10 6 These provisions have been
enthusiastically embraced by the Chinese bar as leading to greater
transparency and fairness in the proceedings. 10 7 Previously, trial by ambush
was common. 108 Key pieces of evidence would be held back from
disclosure and then sprung at trial. 10 9 In those situations, the trial attorney
could request a recess and expect to receive it, but by that time, the damage
may have already been done." 0
There are exceptions to the general exclusionary sanction."' First, if
both parties agree to zhizheng the late evidence, then it can be considered."
12
Additionally, if the late evidence is "new evidence" (* R-j) then it also
can be considered. 113 "New evidence" in this context means evidence newly
discovered after the exchange deadline or evidence that could not be
10o Id.
:01 Telephone Interviews with Ge Xiaoying, supra note 3.
0o2 id.
103 Provisions from the Supreme People's Court, supra note 1, art. 34.
104 Id.
... Id. arts. 43, 47.
"o Id. art. 43.
:07 Telephone Interviews with Ge Xiaoying, supra note 3.
08 Id.
109 Id.
"'0 Id.
... See Provisions from the Supreme People's Court, supra note 1, arts. 34., 43.
12 Id. art. 34.
113 Id. art. 43.
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produced earlier due to "objective reasons." 1 4 If a party suspects that
evidence will not be obtained before the exchange deadline, Articles 36, 41,
and 42 require the party to apply for an order extending the deadline. The
broad theme of these rules is that if a party knows of evidence that it wants
to use and works diligently to obtain it, informing the court along the way of
its efforts, the evidence will likely be allowed if it is obtained, even after the
deadline.' 15 If, however, a party suddenly appears with new evidence, and it
has not described to the court its diligent efforts to obtain it, then the court is
likely to exclude it-unless the party can genuinely show it to be newly
discovered."16
Rebuttal evidence is also allowed under Article 40. After the initial
evidence exchange, a party may submit rebuttal evidence. 17 The court then
selects a date for the rebuttal evidence to be exchanged."18 Unless a case is
very difficult or complicated, the court allows no more than two
exchanges.119
A. The Zhizheng (ff Process
The term zhizheng ( X r ) is sometimes translated as cross-
examination. 120 However, zhizheng is much broader than simply
questioning a witness about his or her testimony. Both witness testimony
and written and physical evidence can be zhizheng-ed. 121 To zhizheng
evidence means to examine and confront it, and only part of that process
includes cross-examining witnesses.
On the evidence exchange deadline, the parties meet at court. 122 The
original evidence is tendered to the court and copies are provided to
opposing parties. 123 The court issues receipts noting the date the evidence
was produced, and the producing party then briefly presents the evidence
specifying its source and significance. 24 This is the beginning of the
Id. art. 41.
"l Id. arts. 34, 36, 41, 42, 43.
116 id.
117 Provisions from the Supreme People's Court, supra note 1, art. 40.
11 Id.
119 Id.
120 See, e.g., Some Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on Evidence in Civil Procedures
(Chinalawinfo Co. Ltd. ed.), translation at http://www.lawinfochina.com/DataBase/LawRegulation (last
visited Nov. 4, 2002).
121 Provisions from the Supreme People's Court, supra note 1, art. 49.
1 2 Telephone Interview with Ge Xiaoying, supra note 3; see also, Provisions from the Supreme
People's Court, supra note 1, arts. 14, 37-9.
'23 Provisions from the Supreme People's Court, supra note 1, art. 14.
124 Id.
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zhizheng process. The opposing parties are then allowed to briefly raise
questions about the evidence concerning its authenticity, relevance, and
credibility. 125 Following this brief examination, the court then records the
opposing parties' reaction to the evidence.' 26 For each piece of evidence, the
opposing parties may object, not object, or state that they need more time to
investigate and form an opinion. 127 The opinion need not be expressed
before the trial date. 12' The objections are noted by the court but no ruling is
made until trial. 129 This process does not foreclose a party from raising new
objections at trial, but hopefully the issues are narrowed. 3 ' It is important to
note that the judicial officer presiding at the evidence exchange is usually
not the trial judge.' 31
Whether or not to object, and when, is a critical strategic choice. If a
piece of evidence is obviously objectionable, then it makes sense to object at
the exchange and to begin building a case against the evidence. Motions in
limine between the evidence exchange and the time of trial are allowed. 132 If,
however, the objection is not obvious and the attorney anticipates that the
other side will not spot the problem, then it may be an advantage not to
object and catch the other side off-guard at trial. An early objection only
gives the opponent an opportunity to prepare. In these situations, Chinese
lawyers sometimes state they do not know whether or not they will object.
While this would present an issue of candor to the tribunal in the United
States-because the attorney actually knows he will object-in China such a
response is part of the accepted gamesmanship before trial. The opponent
has been placed on notice that the evidence may raise an objection. The
opponent is left guessing as to what the objection might be, or whether or
not there will even be an objection. In any case, these types of situations are
much less common in China than they are in United States where hearsay
objections are frequent and a favorable ruling results in the immediate and
conclusive exclusion of the evidence.' 33 In the United States, when an
attorney anticipates that the opposition has failed to identify a hearsay issue,
it is then common for that attorney to lay in wait until the time of trial. A
prior objection made, for example, in a motion in limine, will only allow the
125 id. art. 50; Telephone Interviews with Ge Xiaoying, supra note 3.126 Provisions from the Supreme People's Court, supra note 1, art. 39.
:27 Telephone Interviews with Ge Xiaoying, supra note 3.
28 id.
129 id.
130 Provisions from the Supreme People's Court, supra note 1, art. 39.
'' Telephone Interviews with Ge Xiaoying, supra note 3.
132 Id.
133 See generally FED. R. EviD. 802 (exclusionary rule).
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opposing attorney time to attempt to fit the hearsay evidence within an
exception or make other arrangements to meet the objection.
Following the evidence exchange, parties are free to investigate and
seek out rebuttal evidence. 134 Of course, at trial, the zhizheng process
continues. 13 5 This time, however, the trial judge makes rulings as to whether
or not the evidence is admissible.
VI. DECISION GUIDELINES
China is currently in the process of upgrading and improving its
judiciary. Since the beginning of economic reform, the Chinese judiciary
has grown dramatically. In 1979, there were roughly 58,000 "court
cadres."' 3 6 By 1995, there were 156,000 judges, and by 1997, this number
grew to 250,000.137 Unfortunately, "throughout the 1980s most of China's
judges came to their positions through transfer from Party and military posts.
Most lacked a university education, and very few had received formal legal
instruction."'  In the late 1990s, China instituted training programs and
courses for its judges to attend. 139 Nevertheless, at best, the Chinese
judiciary remains unevenly talented. Part of China's new evidence law
appears to be an educational effort designed to assist judges in critically
evaluating evidence.
Part 5 of the evidence law contains sixteen guidelines courts should
follow when reviewing evidence. These provisions are similar to
instructions read to U.S. jurors at the beginning of a case to help them
evaluate the evidence. For instance, Article 78 states that "when affirming
the testimony of a witness, the People's court may take into account the
witness's intelligence, moral character, knowledge, experience, legal
consciousness, professional abilities, and other features." 140 Similarly,
134 Provisions from the Supreme People's Court, supra note 1, art. 40.
135 Telephone Interviews with Ge Xiaoying, supra note 3.
136 See LUBMAN, supra note 8 at 253.
137 id.
138 id.
139 id.
40 Colorado's witness credibility jury instruction reads as follows:
You are the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given
their testimony. You should take into consideration their means of knowledge, strength of
memory and opportunities for observation; the reasonableness or unreasonableness of
their testimony; the consistency or lack of consistency in their testimony; their motives;
whether their testimony has been contradicted or supported by other evidence; their bias,
prejudice or interest, if any; their manner or demeanor upon the witness stand; and all
MARCH 2003
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
Article 64 requires that "judges shall verify the evidence fairly and
objectively according to procedure, observe the law, follow their
professional ethics, and use logic and their daily life experience to
independently evaluate the evidence's validity and credibility...141
Article 75 is the most interesting decisional guideline provided to
judges. It reads, "where there is evidence to prove that a party possesses
evidence but refuses to provide it without good reason, and if the accusing
party claims that the evidence is unfavorable to the possessor, it may be
deduced that such claim is established.4 42 The quantum of evidence needed
to "prove that a party possesses evidence but refuses to provide it" is
undefined. 143 Undoubtedly the quantum needed will vary between judges
and even from case to case. Some judges, based on little more than an
allegation of non-disclosure, will find the standard to be established. Other
judges may require the party to prove non-disclosure beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Despite the guidelines' occasionally remedial tone, Chinese
practitioners will want to memorize them and use their language during their
arguments and summaries to the court.144 U.S. lawyers routinely incorporate
the language found within jury instructions into their closing arguments.
Such efforts help make their arguments sound more credible, more legally
based, and ultimately more persuasive.
VII. CONCLUSION
China's new evidence law represents a substantial step towards
greater procedural fairness. Evidence law, by its nature, is more concerned
with devising a fair process than the ultimate result reached in a case.
China's new evidence law presents new opportunities and challenges for
China's lawyers. The new burden of proof rules eliminate a freewheeling
process, but also focus responsibility on lawyers to make certain that
appropriate evidence is collected and presented. The new evidence
other facts and circumstances shown by the evidence which affect the credibility of the
witnesses.
Based on these considerations, you may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of
a witness.
Colo. Jury Instr. Civil 3:16 (4th ed. 2001).
I" Provisions from the Supreme People's Court, supra note 1, art. 64 (author's translation).142 Id. art. 75 (author's translation).
143 d.
144 In speaking with Mr. Ge Xiaoying, it was apparent that he had memorized the rules because of the
importance they play in his day to day practice.
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exchange procedures allow parties to confront the evidence against them, but
also require lawyers to prepare early. If they do not, they may suffer the
consequence of exclusion of critical evidence. The new strict rules of
evidence provide direction, while at the same time they create greater
emphasis on courtroom strategy. The rules require Chinese lawyers to focus
not only on how they will present evidence but also on how such evidence
may be excluded and how they might work to exclude an opponent's
evidence.
Of course, all of this assumes that the rules will be enforced by the
courts. The reality is that it will take some time before these rules are fully
accepted. Furthermore, it is likely that the full impact of these rules will not
be understood for quite some time. It is almost certain that some courts,
especially in rural and local jurisdictions, will simply ignore the rules. Even
sophisticated local courts may contort their use to protect local industries.
Be that as it may, at least with respect to the courts in Beijing, the new
evidence rules have already had a significant impact. As time goes along,
and the use and reference to the rules becomes more entrenched, the habits
they engender will also spread. This can only result in greater
professionalism and greater confidence in Chinese courts. The new rules of
evidence are a welcome new addition to Chinese jurisprudence.
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